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Why are Some People More Hostile to Immigrants than Others?
Abstract
Immigration often come with hopes for a better life, mostly in terms of one’s economic situation. While it’s
intuitive to assume the economic opportunism hurts the local labor market and thus rightly triggers local
hostility, this essay argues otherwise. In a political sense, immigration is a conservative strategy, a passive
choice, because the person is not intended to subvert the existent social structure to better his life. However,
on a sociological level, immigration is actually avant-garde, in that life after immigration is highly uncertain.
Therefore it is adventurous, risk-taking, and in a sense, progressive and radical. On the one hand, the
progressive nature of immigration necessitates active and innovative approaches to carve out their new life,
which could challenge the existing social and political structure and order. On the other hand, the passive
nature of immigration determines that their avant-garde spirit could only go so far before being
accommodated within the institutional structure of destination, in which they then negotiate their identity
along with their social, economic, and political position with their local counterparts. It is this re-negotiation
process that could spawn hostility towards immigrants. With several empirical researches providing counter-
intuitive evidence, this essay argues that it is the perceived economic loss of local labor from re-negotiation in
the labor market, particularly during the economic downturn, which encourage hostility towards immigrants.
More importantly, on the political level, the re-negotiation of one’s identity out of growing leverage on an
economic and political level generates the xenophobic rhetoric of some politicians, who channel hostile
sentiment towards immigrants either because of perceived threats or solely for an electoral advantage in a
xenophobic community.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol26/iss1/19
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Immigration often come with hopes for a better 
life, mostly in terms of one’s economic situation. 
While it’s intuitive to assume the economic oppor-
tunism hurts the local labor market and thus rightly 
triggers local hostility, this essay argues otherwise. 
In a political sense, immigration is a conservative 
strategy, a passive choice, because the person is 
not intended to subvert the existent social structure 
to better his life. However, on a sociological lev-
el, immigration is actually avant-garde, in that life 
after immigration is highly uncertain. Therefore it is 
adventurous, risk-taking, and in a sense, progressive 
and radical. On the one hand, the progressive nature 
of immigration necessitates active and innovative 
approaches to carve out their new life, which could 
challenge the existing social and political structure 
and order. On the other hand, the passive nature of 
immigration determines that their avant-garde spirit 
could only go so far before being accommodated 
within the institutional structure of destination, in 
which they then negotiate their identity along with 
their social, economic, and political position with 
their local counterparts. It is this re-negotiation pro-
cess that could spawn hostility towards immigrants. 
With several empirical researches providing count-
er-intuitive evidence, this essay argues that it is the 
perceived economic loss of local labor from re-ne-
gotiation in the labor market, particularly during 
the economic downturn, which encourage hostility 
towards immigrants. More importantly, on the polit-
ical level, the re-negotiation of one’s identity out of 
growing leverage on an economic and political level 
generates the xenophobic rhetoric of some politi-
cians, who channel hostile sentiment towards immi-
grants either because of perceived threats or solely 
for an electoral advantage in a xenophobic commu-
nity. Similarly, the re-negotiation of identity also 
emboldens the need of those who hate immigrants to 
create and strengthen their group identity against the 
existence of immigrant “others.” Although all three 
factors target only a certain group of immigrants, 
they engender “collateral damage” by galvanizing 
hatred sentiment towards other immigrant groups 
(Perez, 2015). Correspondingly, the perceived 
hostility by the immigrant group gives impetus to 
re-negotiation by raising awareness of their own 
group identity, enhancing political participation, 
and further obfuscating their assimilating into the 
host society. Consequently, the enhancing effect of 
re-negotiation in immigrant groups, together with a 
defensive “self-othering” approach, further threatens 
local residents and again feeds into a xenophobic 
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narrative, which is then exploited by both politicians 
and other groups.
First of all, the perceived economic security of 
local labor has been changed by immigrants. The 
following alleged harmful impact of immigrants on 
the local labor market could explain some local hos-
tility towards immigrants. The economic “textbook” 
competitive model simply suggests that an increasing 
supply of labor should lower the wage of competing 
factors, if not crowd out extant employment opportu-
nities. This indication seems to buttress the intuition 
that an increase of immigrants could hurt the econom-
ic benefit of local laborers. This hypothesis seems to 
be substantiated by Borjas (2003). He argues that it 
is biased to only focus on the impact of immigrants 
on a national level because the internal displacement 
of local labor within the nation could conceal the real 
impact of immigrant influx. In addition, he shows 
that education should not be the only gauge to de-
termine the substitutability between immigrants and 
local workers. Immigrants with the same education 
level but different experience would have imperfect 
substitutability due to different working experience. 
However, they would be better substitutes and thus 
harm specific groups of local labors with both simi-
lar education and experience. Therefore, the variance 
in distribution of immigrants with different levels 
of education and work experience would imbalance 
the labor supply and induce harm upon a more spe-
cific “competing native workers”— 3-4% reduction 
in wages from 10% increase in labor supply, for in-
stance. (Borjas, 2003).
In agreement with the economic negative impact 
of the immigrant, Habyarimana et al. (2007) sought 
to explore why increasing diversity, which comes 
along with certain immigrant groups, would under-
mine public goods. Their experiment demonstrates 
that higher levels of ethnic homogeneity brings more 
successful public good provision because of a “strate-
gy selection mechanism” that makes “co-ethnics play 
cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do 
not.” In addition, a “technology mechanism” also bol-
sters better provision in this circumstance because the 
threat of sanctions against non-compliance is more 
salient to co-ethnics who are “more closely linked 
on social networks” (Habyarimana et al., 2007). Al-
though the experiment was conducted in Uganda, its 
implication holds valid that co-ethnics comply better 
within group   norms   like   reciprocity and   coopera-
tion,   plausibly because of the easier identifiability of 
and hence sanctioning on co-ethnics (Habyarimana et 
al., 2007). However, neither of these two proposals 
withstand challenge upon the economic damage on 
local workers.
Refuting the research method and result from 
Borjas (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2012) find that 
variance in experience does not have a substantial im-
pact on the substitutability of immigrants and native 
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workers with the same educational level. More im-
portantly, apart from the traditional “partial wage ef-
fect” of immigrants that mainly focuses on the impact 
upon certain groups, they introduce the “total wage 
effect” that emphasizes “complementarities among 
different types of immigrants and natives.” Together, 
they show that the influx of immigrant has a small 
effect on average native wages (+0.6%) (Ottaviano & 
Peri, 2012). Their finding is in line with the research 
of Card, who finds that in 1990 Mariel immigrants 
increased the Miami labor force by 7% but appeared 
to have virtually no effect on the wages or unemploy-
ment rates (Card, 1990).
Notwithstanding their importance, these empir-
ical researches do not eradicate the local workers’ 
hostile allegation on economic concerns towards im-
migrants, indicating that it is most likely the belief of 
economic harm upon local labors that help sustain the 
hostile sentiment. Along with the changing economic 
position in the labor market, the local laborers had 
to re-negotiate their benefits with these “outsiders,” 
thus generating a grudge that is waiting to erupt at 
the “proper” time, such as in 1982, when “an unusu-
ally severe cyclical effect” caused “one of down turn-
ings on local wage” (Card, 1990). The research by 
Wadsworth et al. also further supports this proposal 
that perceived loss during the social re-negotiation 
of economic benefit generates hostility towards im-
migrants. Focusing on Brexit’s impact of immigrants 
from other EU countries, Wadsworth et al. (2016) 
concludes that while economically EU immigrants 
contribute significantly more than they claim from 
social welfare and thus bolster the British econom-
ic recovery, the general economic circle, such as the 
economic crisis in 2007, can facilitate the ostensible 
causation between an increase of immigrants and job 
loss or wage lowering.
Moreover, if economic concern is really a salient 
factor that generates hostility, then the old generation 
of immigrants should hate the new immigrants more 
than local laborers because, indicated by Ottaviano 
and Peri’s research, that that because the older gen-
eration of immigrants suffer from a substantial nega-
tive effect (-6.7%) on wages after the new inflow of 
immigrants (Ottaviano & Peri, 2012). Such a hypoth-
esis has been countered by Bergh and Bjørklund’s 
research on voting behavior of immigrants in Nor-
way. Bergh and Bjørklund (2011) find that, despite 
economic competition, immigrants groups as a whole 
still share a strong sense of group adherence. This 
collective identity, rather than by individual ideology 
or social-economic background explains the stable 
electoral preference of immigrant groups towards the 
non-Western world for left-of-center parties. That the 
older immigrants might get hurt economically by the 
new-comers does not impede all immigrants from liv-
ing together and, in addition to their economic gains, 
claim political power.
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Furthermore, Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) test the 
Group Threat theory and find that “Anglos residing in 
communities where the size of the out-group is large 
are less likely to participate than individuals who re-
side in communities where the size of the out-group 
is small.” Although Leighley and Vedlitz’s finding 
does not mean that the minority candidates could 
benefit significantly from their ethnicity, Anthony et 
al., find that the candidates from those constituencies 
with smaller immigrant population could indeed ben-
efit more electorally when they specifically appeal 
to non-immigrant voters. This political exploitation 
is particularly true when the minority candidates are 
Muslims, whom are much less favored by Anglo vot-
ers (Anthony et al., 2014). Therefore, given the rising 
number of immigrants under the economic strain, it is 
particularly convenient, or even contingent, for some 
politicians to exploit the tension between immigra-
tion influx and discontent of locals. Brexit and the 
election of Donald Trump, to a certain extent, attest 
to such explanation.
Besides  the  exploitative  and  instrumentalized  
politicization  of  hostile sentiment  against  immi-
grants,  some  people  are genuinely  averse  to  the 
immigrant groups in the process to re-negotiate their 
social roles. Researchers on hate groups in the U.S. 
who are against undocumented immigrants, Gem-
ignani and Hernandez-Albujar (2015) demonstrate 
how these hate groups forge the narrative of threat 
from “irregular immigrants” on “specific social or-
ders and values, for instance about citizenship, na-
tional identity and otherness.” Differing from hostile 
groups who mainly focus on economic or electoral 
aspects, Hate groups are ideological organizations 
of individuals who “have beliefs or practices that at-
tack   or   malign   an   entire   class   of   people,   
typically   for   their   immutable characteristics...” 
tend to follow extreme-right and white suprema-
cist ideologies (Adamczyk et al., 2014; Mulholland, 
2013; Gemignani & Albujar, 2015). Validating the 
left-centrist electoral preference of immigrant groups 
as mentioned above, hate groups embrace the dis-
course of identity development through the ongoing 
dialogue of “I am/I am not and you are/you are not” 
(Gemignani & Albujar, 2015). On the one hand, they 
develop their own identity as “heroes, saviors and 
protectors of American values” who are “acting for 
the service of legality and justice,” on the other hand, 
they label those unauthorized immigrants as “invad-
ers, aliens, drug dealers, parasites and prostitutes 
threatening the pre-established social order,” in this 
way reducing one’s “humanity “his/her border cross-
ing” (Gemignani & Albujar, 2015). Despite that the 
members of hate groups ostensibly only target undoc-
umented immigrants, they actually “push the limits of 
mainstream discourse”, in a way to normalize view 
and opinions of discrimination and violence that go 
beyond the unauthorized group, those discourse that 
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would otherwise be regarded as radical (Gemignani 
& Albujar, 2015). 
Not only problematizing and even self-criminal-
izing the unauthorized immigrant by this self-granted 
judicature position, the hate groups also demonstrate 
their distrust and disappointment towards government 
in dealing with such problem. In response, the hate 
groups proclaim “a supposed ability to address [the 
problem of undocumented immigrants]”, while in the 
meantime “develop specific positions of power for 
themselves” (Gemignani & Albujar, 2015). Through 
the “narratives of reification (e.g. the creation of the 
‘illegal’), opposition (us versus them), exclusion, su-
periority (e.g. of the native citizen over the undoc-
umented   immigrant), problematization, instillation   
of fear, and depicting undocumented immigrants as 
disposable, second-class members of society,” those 
hate group  members  create  their  own  subjectivi-
ties,  along  with  imposing  their  own narrative of 
immigrants on others (Gemignani & Albujar, 2015).   
Rather   than economically or politically motivated, 
these hate group members are “part of a larger and  
more  pervasive  discourse  of  neo-liberal  discrim-
ination”  that  actively  creates systematic cleavages 
between “insiders and outsiders, winners and losers 
(or, legals and illegals), and full citizens and sec-
ond-class newcomers” (Gemignani & Albujar, 2015). 
Together   with   their   internalized   hostility   against   
immigrants,   their   collective disappointment  with  
mainstream  government  further  consolidates  their  
in-group identity,  highlighting  their  sense  of  moral  
obligation  that  they  are  the  only  saviors against 
the “invaders,” thus making them blame and hate im-
migrants more.
In response to hostility, the immigrant groups 
are lambs to the slaughter. In fact, as mentioned  at  
the  beginning  of  this  essay,  the  progressive  and  
radical  features  of immigration have determined 
that immigrants, who brave the uncertainty lying 
ahead of their migration, will adjust their habits to 
strive for a better life. Therefore when xenophobic 
rhetoric prevails, such hostility against immigrants 
actually raises the “salience of ethnic identity and 
impugns its worth” (Perez, 2015).  In particular, the 
“strong political response” elicited by xenophobic 
rhetoric in the minority group is to assert the worth 
of a group they value (Perez, 2015). In accordance 
with findings such as that of Bergh, which showed 
the variance of group loyalty between the new com-
ers and those who have settled in their host country 
in a while, Perez also demonstrates the importance 
of acculturation of individuals  whose “orientation 
toward a host society might be described  as  im-
plying  distance  from,  or  less  contact  with,  the  
mainstream  public” (Perez, 2015). This self-other-
ing factor is particularly noteworthy in its influence 
on the “the  second  generation:  the  American-born  
offspring of  immigrants  who  bridge the least  and  
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most  acculturated  elements  of  the   Latino  com-
munity”  (Perez, 2015). Combining  with  the  find-
ings  that  the  descendants  of  immigrants  perform 
better at school They are also more likely to attain 
a higher education. This finding suggests that those 
second  generation  immigrants  would  have  better  
economic  prospects  and  higher political partici-
pation rates. Xenophobia, whether it is economic, 
political, or social, only leads to further alienation 
between local residents in host societies and immi-
grants, thus exacerbating the confrontational rela-
tionship.
Sometimes hostility comes not from negative 
sentiment, but actually from a benevolent attempt 
to bridge the gap. As exemplified by the attempt of 
the U.S. government to force assimilation of German 
immigrants during and after WWI. During 1917 and 
1923, several U.S. states barred foreign language 
from their schools, particularly German, in hope to 
lessen the cultural identity of German immigrants. 
Such policy “instigated a backlash”:  those German 
descendants who had been affected by the language 
law, particularly those children who had two Ger-
man parents, were less likely to volunteer in WWII, 
and more likely to marry within their ethnic group, 
as well as to choose decidedly German names for 
their offspring (Fouka, 2016). Therefore, the genuine 
attempt to assimilate immigrants could also lead to 
inter-group segregation—self-othering, which poten-
tially induces mutual hostility.
Resonating with the strengthening effect in-
group identity generated by deliberate xenophobia 
as mentioned above, this backlash also confirms that 
“parental investment overcompensate for the direct 
effects of assimilation policies” (Fouka, 2016). This 
may explain Group Conflict theory which emphasiz-
es the historical relationship between two groups, that 
ethnic diversity could indeed undermine the provision 
of the higher level of public goods. However, this ex-
ample, as well as other ones mentioned in this essay, 
illustrate that the failure of the public goods provi-
sion is attributed to these factors for their facilitat-
ing inter-group hostility and segregation, as claimed 
by Habyarimana et al. (2007). In other words, it is 
the policy in response to ethnic diversity, rather than 
ethnic diversity per se, that is the cause of failure of 
public goods provision.
Nonetheless, the perceived economic loss of lo-
cal labors, the power re-negotiation out of a growing 
leverage on an economic and political level gener-
ates the xenophobic rhetoric of some politicians, and 
the identitarian re-negotiation of those hate group 
members explain why some people are more hostile 
towards immigrants. The immigrant group gives 
impetus to the re-negotiation by rising awareness of 
their own group identity, enhancing political par-
ticipation, and further obfuscates their assimilation 
into the host society. Consequently, the enhancing 
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effect of re-negotiation in immigrant group, togeth-
er with their defensive “self-othering” approach, 
further threatens local residents and again feeds into 
a xenophobic narrative which is then exploited by 
both politicians and other groups. In the meantime, 
the confrontational responses from immigrant group 
only exacerbate the hostility.
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